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P eople know many objective facts about themselves, such as their age and how tall they are. It might seem obvious that people also would know their more subjective 
likes and dislikes—what they value and what they disdain—and know why they feel 
this way. However, research suggests that this is more complicated than it may first 
appear. In this chapter we review social- psychological studies on what people know 
about their attitudes, where they come from, and how they can be changed. We will 
see that although people have various notions (naive theories) about different aspects 
of their attitudes, these theories may or may not be accurate. We address whether or 
not this matters. We argue that both what people actually know about their attitudes 
and what they think they know can have important implications for how they pro-
cess information about the world and how likely they are to modify and act on their 
attitudes.
Attitudes refer to general evaluations individuals have regarding people (includ-
ing themselves), places, objects, and issues (e.g., ice cream is good; chocolate- covered 
cockroaches are nasty). Although some people enjoy evaluation more than others 
and are thus more likely to form attitudes (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), virtually everyone 
has attitudes about a diversity of objects and issues (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & 
Pratto, 1992). Attitudes are important because of their influence on people’s choices 
and actions; that is, all else being equal, people decide to buy the products they like 
the most, attend the university they evaluate most favorably, and vote for the Presi-
dential candidate they approve of most strongly. People who do not know what their 
attitudes are, they might not know how to act (“Should I buy chocolate or vanilla ice 
cream?”). Yet, as we see shortly, people do not always know what their attitudes are. 
And, even if people know their attitudes, they may not know where these attitudes 
come from, on what they are based, and what they do. After tackling these issues, we 
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turn to the question of whether people know how and when they can change their 
own attitudes and the attitudes of others.
knowing about attitudes, Their bases and consequences
Explicit versus Implicit Attitude Measures
Because researchers initially made the seemingly reasonable assumption that people 
have knowledge of their own attitudes, most attitude measurement procedures simply 
ask people to report their evaluations (e.g., “On a scale where –5 means extremely bad 
and +5 means extremely good, how would you rate your evaluation of ice cream?”). 
Indeed, much research suggests that attitudes often come to mind automatically 
upon merely encountering an attitude object and can be reported rather quickly (e.g., 
see Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986). An interesting puzzle, however, is that sometimes when researchers 
use implicit measures of attitudes such as the evaluative priming procedure (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) or the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) that assess evaluations that come to mind automati-
cally, they find that the attitudes observed are different from the ones that people 
report on more deliberative self- assessments (e.g., Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, 
& Banaji, 2009). For example, when responding to an object such as the self or a 
member of a racial minority group, people might explicitly say that they like (or dis-
like) the object, but an implicit measure tapping into an automatic evaluation might 
show that the opposite evaluation comes to mind spontaneously.
Although much of the time implicit and explicit measures tell the same story 
about one’s attitudes, what does it mean when these measures produce different out-
comes? There are a number of possibilities (see Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009). In what 
might be called a single attitude approach, some have argued that the automatic 
attitude that comes to mind spontaneously is the “real” attitude (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 
Albers, & Bongers, 2009), whereas the explicit measure represents an evaluation col-
ored by “downstream” influences (e.g., see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Olson 
& Fazio, 2009). Importantly, the fact that downstream influences modify what peo-
ple explicitly report as their attitude does not mean that people are unaware of their 
automatic evaluative tendencies. For example, people might not report a gut feeling 
because of fear that it might not be approved of by society (Olson & Fazio, 2003). 
Or a person might know what evaluative reaction automatically comes to mind but 
choose not to report it because he or she is uncertain of its origin or has concerns 
that it is inappropriate to rely on gut feelings. In support of the latter possibility, 
in one study (Loersch, McCaslin, & Petty, 2011), college students received neutral 
verbal information about a target person, as well as positive or negative associative 
information (i.e., pleasant or unpleasant pictures) presented subliminally (i.e, outside 
of conscious awareness). Prior research had suggested that the former information 
affected explicit measures, whereas the latter did not. When the standard attitude 
instructions were given, the subliminal associative information did not affect explicit 
attitude reports as in past research (see Rydell & McConnell, 2006). However, when 
instructed that going with gut feelings was legitimate, explicit measures of attitudes 
were influenced by the subliminal affective stimuli.
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Other research further indicates that when people are led to believe (or already 
believe) that relying on their intuitions is legitimate, explicit and implicit measures 
become more highly correlated (see Jordan, Whitfield, & Ziegler-Hill, 2007; Ran-
ganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). In general, the available research suggests that peo-
ple sometimes have insight into their automatic evaluative reactions but choose not 
to rely upon these feelings when making explicit attitude reports because of social 
desirability fears or concerns that this information is not diagnostic or valid. It is 
also possible that people might not even notice these quick reactions unless they 
are motivated (or prompted) to search for them. In such cases, the explicit attitudes 
reported would presumably be based on a search for information people have about 
the object in memory or by factors in the immediate context. For example, a negative 
reaction might come to mind immediately upon presentation of an attitude object 
(and represent the person’s attitude), but if the person does not notice this reaction 
or understand its source, or questions its validity, this negative reaction might be 
overridden by positive feelings from the environment, and the person would report a 
favorable evaluation.
Rather than assuming that implicit measures are needed to assess the real attitude, 
another point of view on implicit– explicit discrepancies is that (putting lying aside) 
the person has two attitudes and both are meaningful. On the one hand, there is the 
attitude that the person acknowledges and can report; on the other hand, there is an 
automatic and more hidden attitude. In essence, this view argues that people can hold 
separate explicit and implicit attitudes, the first of which is open to conscious aware-
ness, whereas the second is not (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000). Although there are several versions of this dual- attitudes approach, 
one or more of the following assumptions are commonly made (see Petty & Briñol, 
2009; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007). First, the dual attitudes are thought to have 
separate mental representations that could be stored in separate brain regions (e.g., 
see DeCoster, Banner, Smith, & Semin, 2006). A second common assumption is that 
the two attitudes stem from distinct mental processes. Implicit attitudes are said to 
result from relatively automatic associative processes, whereas explicit attitudes stem 
from more deliberative propositional processes (e.g., Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & 
Strain, 2006). Third, implicit and explicit attitudes are postulated to be relatively 
independent and to operate in different situations, such that explicit attitudes oper-
ate primarily when people are being thoughtful, but implicit attitudes operate when 
people are being spontaneous (see Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & How-
ard, 1997). When considering all of these assumptions together, the dual- attitudes 
framework suggests that the attitudes people explicitly report holding versus those 
that come to mind automatically can be quite different.
Explicit versus Implicit Attitudes and Ambivalence
A third point of view on explicit– implicit discrepancies comes from the metacognitive 
model of attitude structure (MCM; Petty & Briñol, 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMar-
ree, 2007). The MCM shares some features with each of the two approaches just 
described, but it also has some differences. In brief, the MCM holds that attitude 
objects can be linked in memory to both positive and negative evaluations that spring 
to mind automatically, but that these evaluations can differ in the extent to which 
160 DOMAINS OF SELF‑KNOWLEDgE
they are explicitly endorsed. When both positive and negative evaluations come to 
mind automatically and are endorsed (i.e., a person believes these represent his or her 
true assessments), the person’s attitude is best described as being explicitly ambiva-
lent. On a bipolar measure, an ambivalent person might appear to endorse a moder-
ate or neutral attitude that represents his or her attempt to integrate both positivity 
and negativity. Because of this, it is sometimes useful to assess the positivity and 
negativity of underlying attitudes separately and calculate an objective ambivalence 
score (e.g., Kaplan, 1972). When people are aware of holding opposing positive and 
negative reactions to an attitude object, they report feeling conflicted, confused, torn, 
and mixed about the object (e.g.,Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna, & Grif-
fin, 1995). This conflict is especially apparent when people are about to make an 
attitude- relevant decision (van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009).
In addition to this intrapersonal discrepancy, interpersonal factors also contrib-
ute to feelings of ambivalence. In particular, when people believe that their attitudes 
are discrepant from those of liked others, there are feelings of conflict (Priester & 
Petty, 2001). One reason for this is that people want to agree with people they like, 
as specified by balance theory (Heider, 1958), and when they do not, they feel some 
tension. In addition, disagreement with liked others can indicate that one’s attitude 
is incorrect (Festinger, 1954), which is also troublesome. Research has extended the 
causes of subjective ambivalence to include concerns about conflicting information 
that might exist but to which individuals have not yet been exposed (Priester, Petty, 
& Park, 2007) and to discrepancies between individuals’ actual attitudes and the 
attitudes they would ideally like to possess (DeMarree, Wheeler, Briñol, & Petty, 
2011). We discuss the latter in more detail later in this chapter.
When the cause of the conflict is explicit, people report being ambivalent, and 
the uncomfortable feeling that results from this state produces a number of important 
outcomes. For example, the more ambivalence people experience regarding an object, 
the slower they are to report their attitudes (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 
1992) and the less functional the attitudes become in guiding behavior (Armitage & 
Conner, 2000; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004). Given that subjective ambiva-
lence tends to be a negative state, people are motivated to reduce it. The motivation 
to reduce ambivalence can lead people to pay careful attention to and think about 
information that might help them to resolve their conflict (e.g., Clark, Wegener, & 
Fabrigar, 2008; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996).
According to the MCM, in addition to the explicit ambivalence people report and 
feel when they acknowledge the source of the conflict (e.g., there are both positive 
and negative aspects to some object; “I disagree with my parents about this”), a more 
subtle kind of conflict, called implicit ambivalence can occur when people are not 
fully aware of an explicit conflict. For example, implicit ambivalence occurs if both 
positive and negative reactions to an object automatically come to mind, but one of 
these is endorsed as one’s attitude and the other is rejected (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & 
Jarvis, 2006). A rejected evaluation might be a past attitude that still comes to mind 
when the object is present (e.g., “I used to like smoking, but now I want to quit”), an 
association that was never endorsed but nonetheless comes to mind due to one’s cul-
ture (e.g., from continuous depictions of a minority group and criminal activity in the 
media), or simply a vague feeling of unknown origin. In cases of implicit ambivalence, 
even though the person does not endorse opposite evaluations of the attitude object, 
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he or she can nevertheless feel uncomfortable when considering the object because 
unendorsed gut feelings conflict with endorsed evaluations (see Epstein, 2003; Petty 
& Briñol, 2009; Rydell et al., 2008).
In a series of studies, Briñol, Petty, and Wheeler (2006) have shown that discrep-
ancies between automatic and deliberative measures can tap into this implicit ambiv-
alence and are consequential. As noted earlier, one documented consequence of the 
doubt that emerges from explicit ambivalence is that it leads to enhanced information 
processing in a presumed attempt to resolve the ambivalence. In one study testing the 
notion that explicit– implicit attitude discrepancies can lead to enhanced information 
processing (Briñol et al., 2006, Experiment 4), undergraduates’ self- evaluations (self-
 esteem) were assessed with both automatic and deliberative measures, then the abso-
lute value of the difference between the two standardized measures was calculated as 
the index of discrepancy. Next, participants were exposed to either a strong or weak 
message about eating vegetables that was framed as self- relevant or not. The degree 
to which participants processed the message information was assessed by examin-
ing the extent to which the quality of the arguments affected postmessage attitudes 
toward vegetables (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The more people process a message 
carefully, the more argument strength affects their evaluations.
The results of this study revealed that when the message was framed as self-
 relevant (i.e., relevant to one’s personal life and thus relevant to the discrepancy), the 
extent of explicit– implicit discrepancy interacted with argument quality to affect atti-
tudes. Specifically, the greater this discrepancy, the more participants differentiated 
strong from weak arguments. However, when the same strong and weak messages 
were framed as irrelevant to the self (i.e., the message was said to be about the proper-
ties of vegetables), explicit– implicit discrepancy did not interact with argument qual-
ity to predict attitudes. This suggests that explicit– implicit discrepancies do not lead 
to motivation to process all information—only information relevant to the object for 
which the discrepancy occurs.
In addition to examining implicit– explicit discrepancies that already existed, 
Petty and his colleagues (2006) also investigated discrepancies created in the labora-
tory. In one study, college students were first classically conditioned to like or dislike 
a target individual in order to create an initial attitude toward the target. Then, the 
participants received explicit information about the target individual that led them 
either to maintain their initially reported attitude or to change it. Next, participants 
were told that the target person was a candidate for a job at their university. To 
evaluate the candidate, they were provided with either a strong or a weak resumé to 
examine.
The key result was that participants’ explicit attitudes toward the target person 
were more influenced by resumé quality in the condition when attitudes were changed 
than when attitudes toward the candidate had not been changed; that is, even though 
people whose attitudes were changed now held the same explicit attitude toward the 
target as people whose attitudes had not changed, they engaged in greater scrutiny of 
the resumé as if they were attempting to resolve some underlying ambivalence about 
the candidate. In this case, the implicit ambivalence stemmed from a conflict between 
the old attitude (which was still automatically activated) and the new one. These 
individuals did not report being ambivalent about the target person because they 
only endorsed their new attitude. Nonetheless, the fact that the old attitude did not 
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disappear led them to feel conflicted, and they therefore engaged in greater processing 
of information about the person (see also Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2008).
Knowing What Our Attitudes Are: Summary
In conclusion, what does the work on implicit versus explicit attitude measures tell 
us about whether people have knowledge of their attitudes? First, it is clear that 
when both deliberative and automatic assessments of attitudes agree, it suggests that 
people are aware of their attitudes and can report them rather easily. The fact that 
implicit and explicit measures of attitudes often do agree across a wide variety of 
attitude objects suggests that people typically are aware of their attitudes (Greenwald 
et al., 2009). This makes sense, of course, because if people were not aware of their 
attitudes, they would not know how to behave, or their behavior would be wildly 
inconsistent across time, but this is not the case.
However, we have seen that automatic and deliberative measures of attitudes do 
not always agree, and we have provided three different conceptualizations of this. 
Our own view, captured by the MCM, is that when there is genuine divergence in 
the valence of what implicit and explicit attitude measures indicate (i.e., the person is 
not attempting to be deceptive on either measure), then the attitude object is linked 
to both positivity and negativity in memory and for some reason one of these associa-
tions is not accepted; that is, the person’s theory about the unendorsed valence, if it 
is perceived at all, is that it either does not stem from the attitude object or it stems 
from the attitude object but is invalid to consider for some reason (e.g., it represents 
an old attitude or is an association from the culture). Because one valence is rejected, 
the person will not report being ambivalent, but may nonetheless experience discom-
fort when the attitude object is brought to mind. When deliberating about how to 
act, people generally behave in accord with what they believe their attitudes to be, as 
assessed by explicit measures. However, when people are acting more spontaneously 
without reflection, then automatic evaluative associations, as assessed with implicit 
measures, are more likely to have an impact (Dovidio et al., 1997; see Olson & Fazio, 
2003). Finally, we have seen that both implicit and explicit attitudes can jointly influ-
ence information processing when these evaluations are in conflict.
Knowing How Much Knowledge We Have
Even though people are often aware of what their attitudes are, they are not necessar-
ily aware of why they hold the attitudes they do (Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011; Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Hodges, 1992); that is, people might or might not know 
what underlies their attitudes. This, however, does not prevent people from having 
naive theories about the bases of their attitudes, which are consequential even though 
these naive theories do not necessarily correspond with reality.
First, consider what people know about how much knowledge they have on an 
attitude issue. People make decisions based on not only what they actually know 
(objective amount of knowledge; see Wood et al., 1995) but also on what they think 
they know (subjective amount of knowledge); that is, regardless of its accuracy, 
subjective knowledge has been documented to have important consequences. For 
example, Radecki and Jaccard (1995) measured participants’ knowledge of nutrition 
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with a self- report questionnaire (subjective knowledge), as well as their performance 
on a multiple- choice test (objective knowledge). After the researcher controlled for 
objective knowledge, subjective knowledge predicted information search, such that 
participants with less subjective knowledge requested more information on the issue 
than did participants with more subjective knowledge (see also Brucks, 1985). This 
research suggests that the more people think they know about something, the less 
likely they are to expend resources on processing or seeking additional information 
on that topic. Research suggests that the more knowledge on which people think their 
attitudes are based, the more certain they are about the validity of those attitudes (see 
Rucker, Petty, & Briñol, 2008), and the more certain they are about their current atti-
tudes, the less people believe it is necessary to consider additional information (e.g., 
Briñol, Petty, Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007; Horcajo, Petty, & Briñol, 2010).
Despite the importance of subjective knowledge, relatively little research has 
examined the relationship between objective and subjective knowledge. Although 
some research suggests that increases in perceived knowledge accompany increases 
in actual knowledge (e.g., Smith, Fabrigar, MacDougall, & Wiesenthal, 2008), other 
research shows that people often have a poorly calibrated perception of how knowl-
edgeable they are (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Indeed, 
it is possible to vary perceptions of knowledge about attitude objects in the absence 
of any real differences in knowledge. For example, in one study (Tormala & Petty, 
2007), students were presented with a large or small amount of positive information 
about one attitude object (e.g., a person) followed by a moderate amount of positive 
information about a different attitude object (e.g., a store). When the information 
about the second object was preceded by a small amount of information about the 
first object, people felt more knowledgeable about the second object than when it was 
preceded by a large amount of information about the first object (a contrast effect). 
Importantly, these perceptions of knowledge in the absence of real knowledge differ-
ences led to more favorable attitudes in the condition with greater perceived knowl-
edge, in line with a “more is better” heuristic (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).
Recent research has even suggested that increasing actual knowledge about an 
attitude object can sometimes lead to reductions in perceived knowledge. In this 
research (Rucker, Lee, & Briñol, 2011), when people’s attention was directed toward 
the incremental value of new information over the starting point of no knowledge, 
their perceptions of knowledge increased. However, when attention was directed 
toward how the new knowledge signaled what else was not known, people showed 
reduced perceptions of knowledge. Importantly, the extent to which people thought 
they knew about the attitude object was consequential in terms of processing infor-
mation relevant to that attitude object. Specifically, the less people thought they knew 
about the topic, the more processing they did of information relevant to the object.
In closing, we note that perceptions of knowledge can also change as a function 
of variables unrelated to the presence of new information. For example, in one study 
(Belding, Briñol, & Petty, 2011), participants were found to feel more knowledge-
able and intelligent after they were induced to wear reading glasses versus an item 
associated with athleticism (i.e., a baseball cap; see also Kellerman & Laird, 1982). 
Furthermore, participants who were wearing the glasses processed persuasive mes-
sages more carefully than participants wearing the cap. Note that this is the oppo-
site effect that perceived knowledge had in the research on processing just described 
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by Rucker and colleagues (2011). We speculate that when people infer that knowl-
edge means that they are intelligent and capable of processing (e.g., when wearing 
glasses), they are more likely to process information, since it fits their momentary 
self- conception (see Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007), but when people infer that 
knowledge means that they are already certain of their attitude, then they are less 
likely to process because acquiring new information seems less necessary in the face 
of an already correct opinion.
Knowing the Affective versus Cognitive Origins of Attitudes
Just as people can reflect upon how much knowledge underlies their attitudes, they can 
also think about the nature of that information. One important and classic distinc-
tion is whether attitudes are based on emotion or cognition (Breckler, 1984; Zanna 
& Rempel, 1988). A number of studies have shown that it is possible to determine 
whether a given attitude is actually based on emotion, cognition, or a combination of 
the two. This can be done, for example, by seeing whether a global measure of peo-
ple’s attitudes (e.g., how people rate an object as good vs. bad) correlates more highly 
with their ratings of emotion- relevant qualities (e.g., how happy vs. sad the object 
makes them feel) or cognitive- relevant qualities (e.g., how useful vs. useless the object 
seems; see Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994). The underlying cognitive versus affective 
structural basis of attitudes has been shown to have important consequences. For 
example, it is generally more effective to change attitudes based on emotion with 
emotional messages rather than with more cognitive or rational appeals (Edwards, 
1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999).
Independent of whether attitudes actually are based on affect or cognition, peo-
ple’s perceptions of the basis of their attitudes can be assessed by asking them about 
the extent to which they believe that their attitudes are cognitively or affectively based 
(See, Petty, & Fabrigar, 2008). Importantly, individuals’ theories about the affective 
versus cognitive bases of their attitudes predict persuasion independent of the actual 
(structural) basis of their attitudes; that is, just as it is generally more effective to use 
emotional appeals for individuals whose attitudes have an affective structural basis, 
it is also more effective to use an emotional appeal for individuals who perceive their 
attitudes to be based on affect, whether or not this is true. Additional research has 
shown that use of persuasion strategies in line with the actual structural bases of 
attitudes tends to be more effective when people’s responses to the message are spon-
taneous, such as when they are under time pressure, but use of persuasion strategies 
in line with perceived bases is more effective when people are being deliberative (See 
et al., 2008).
Why might people not know the bases of their attitudes? With respect to 
affective– cognitive bases, past research suggests that when people think about their 
attitudinal bases, what comes to mind may not be representative of the actual struc-
tural content of their attitudes. For instance, in one study (Wilson, Dunn, Bybee, 
Hyman, & Rotondo, 1984), when participants were asked to examine why they liked 
or disliked an attitude object, they were able to do so, but attitudes assessed shortly 
after this did not predict behavior very well. Wilson and colleagues (1984) suggested 
that this was because the reasons people listed as supporting their attitudes were inac-
curate or incomplete. In particular, people often underestimated the role of affect in 
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determining attitudes. Moreover, even if people are able to identify a representative 
sample of the bases of their attitudes (both affective and cognitive), they must also be 
able to gauge the unique contribution of each basis to their global evaluation in order 
to have an accurate assessment. This is likely to be a difficult task, particularly in 
cases in which affect and cognition are evaluatively consistent. Thus, true insight into 
the actual affective versus cognitive basis of many attitudes could be rare.
Knowing the Consequences of Attitudes
Just as people may not know the actual bases of their attitudes, they are often igno-
rant of the impact of their attitudes. Attitudes have many consequences, such as guid-
ing perception, information processing, and action (Fazio, 1995), but people do not 
appear to appreciate this sufficiently. For example, people appear to underestimate 
how much their attitudes bias their thinking and influence their perception of other 
objects in an attitude- congruent fashion (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Nevertheless, 
people appear to have at least some recognition of which of their attitudes are more 
consequential than others.
There are a number of indicators of how consequential or strong attitudes are (see 
Petty & Krosnick, 1995). One that we have discussed already is how much knowl-
edge people have, or perceive themselves to have, about an issue (e.g., Wood, Rhodes, 
& Biek, 1995). Others include how accessible the attitude is (Fazio, 1995) and how 
much people have thought about their attitudes (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). 
As was the case for attitude knowledge and affective– cognitive bases, for virtually 
every seemingly objective indicator of an attitude’s strength, such as the actual speed 
with which it comes to mind or the actual amount of thinking in which people have 
engaged regarding their attitudes, there is a parallel measure of the perceived ease of 
attitude access or the perceived extent of thought (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & 
Petty, 1995). People’s perceptions of the qualities of their attitudes can show a reason-
able correlation with their objective qualities, though the correlation is far from per-
fect. For example, in one study, when researchers manipulated the extent of thought 
by using distraction (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976) and personal relevance (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979b), these manipulations affected not only the actual extent of think-
ing as measured by the number of thoughts listed but also the perceived extent of 
thinking (see Barden & Petty, 2008). However, this knowledge is incomplete because 
as we see shortly, the perceived qualities of one’s attitudes can be affected in the 
absence of differences in the real qualities.
Perhaps the most studied subjective indicator of how strong or consequential 
an attitude is involves the confidence or certainty people have in the validity of their 
attitudes. Attitude confidence is associated with a number of attitude strength con-
sequences (for reviews, see Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007; Tormala & 
Rucker, 2007; Visser & Holbrook, 2012). For example, attitudes that people hold 
with high certainty are more resistant to change (e.g., Kiesler, 1971), persistent in 
the absence of a persuasive attack (Bassili, 1996), and more predictive of behavior 
(Fazio & Zanna, 1978) than attitudes about which there is doubt. Obviously people 
can report the certainty with which they hold an attitude, since this is a subjective 
assessment, but their reasons or theories for why they are certain can be inaccurate. 
Furthermore, certainty can affect how consequential attitudes are for at least two 
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reasons. First, certainty can make attitudes stronger because the certainty is linked 
to structural differences in attitudes. For example, attitudes that are thought about 
more (Barden & Petty, 2008) or that are more accessible (Fazio & Zanna, 1978) are 
held with greater certainty. If attitudes high in certainty come to mind more readily, 
they are more able to guide behavior, and thinking about them more helps them resist 
attack.
Second, attitude certainty can render attitudes more consequential even if the cer-
tainty is not tied to any structural differences (Tormala & Petty, 2002). For example, 
if people are merely led to believe that they have thought a lot about their attitudes 
(Barden & Petty, 2008) or that they have gained more knowledge supporting their 
attitudes (Rucker & Petty, 2004; Rucker et al., 2008), they feel more certain. This is 
important because research shows that attitudes held with greater certainty are more 
likely to guide behavior, even if these perceptions are not true. Thus, although people 
can have a sense of which of their many attitudes are consequential (as indexed by 
certainty), this sense is derived from a combination of verifiable facts (e.g., how much 
thinking they have actually done) as well as misperceptions (e.g., perceptions of hav-
ing thought in the absence of real differences). Regardless of the origin, attitude cer-
tainty makes attitudes more consequential.
Knowing How to Correct Attitudes for Presumed Biases
In concluding our discussion of people’s knowledge about their attitudes, we note 
that, beginning with Festinger’s (1954) classic discussion of social comparison pro-
cesses, people have been presumed to want to hold subjectively correct attitudes. We 
have already noted that people typically have good access to their attitudes, but they 
do not always have good access to the basis of their attitudes. If people do not know 
what their attitudes are based on, how can they know whether their attitudes are 
accurate? Festinger proposed that people mostly rely on comparisons with the atti-
tudes of others. To the extent that people agree with others, they can infer that their 
attitudes are correct. Subsequent research (Goethals & Nelson, 1973) has suggested 
that people are especially likely to assume validity when the others who agree with 
their attitudes are similar to them. In matters of fact rather than opinion, however, 
greater validity comes when dissimilar others agree.
Knowledge about one’s attitudes and social consensus do not provide the only 
cues to validity, however. People also infer validity from numerous other factors, 
such as how easily their attitudes are retrieved from memory (Haddock, Rothman, 
Reber, & Schwarz, 1999) or whether their attitudes are perceived to have a moral 
basis (Wagner, Petty, & Briñol, 2011). Furthermore, if people perceive that there are 
factors operating that might have biased their attitudes, they take corrective action. 
These corrections are based on beliefs people have about the magnitude and nature of 
the bias that has occurred (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & 
Brekke, 1994). If people could accurately diagnose the causes of their attitudes, they 
could likely correct their attitudes accurately. But since people are often unaware of 
the real causes of their attitudes, their attempts at correction follow their theories of 
bias rather than the actual bias that has occurred. Because of this, people sometimes 
correct for a factor that they believe biased their attitude (since it is consistent with 
their naive theory of bias) even though it had no effect. In such situations, the factor 
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perceived as biasing can end up producing a reverse bias (e.g., see Petty, Wegener, & 
White, 1998). For example, if people overestimate the extent to which attending a 
funny movie with a date has made them like their date for the evening, and they cor-
rect their evaluation of the date based on this overestimate, this could lead them to 
like the date even less than if they had not attended the funny movie at all.
knowing about attitude change
So far, we have focused on what people know about their attitudes, and the bases 
and consequences of those attitudes. We turn now to the question of attitude change 
and address issues such as whether, how, and when people know that their attitudes 
have been changed, and to what extent people know whether, how, and when they 
can change their own attitudes and those of others.
Do People Know When Their Attitudes Have Changed?
People like to think they are coherent and may believe that people who change their 
opinions too easily are wishy-washy. As a consequence, research suggests that when 
people’s attitudes have changed as a result of some manipulation, such as writing a 
counterattitudinal essay (Bem & McConnell, 1970) or participating in a group dis-
cussion (Goethals & Reckman, 1973), they often misremember their prechange atti-
tude as being the same as their current attitude. This distortion implies that people 
are not aware that their attitudes have changed, but are only aware of their current 
attitude. Then, people assume that they have always felt this way. Even when people 
acknowledge that their attitudes have changed to some degree, they may underesti-
mate the extent of that change (Wilson, Houston, & Meyers, 1998).
The fact that people misremember their old attitudes as being consistent with 
their new ones might help to explain why people also can misremember their past 
behaviors as being consistent with their newly changed attitudes. In one study (Ross, 
McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981), for example, when students were given a message 
in favor of toothbrushing, their current attitudes toward the practice became more 
positive, and they also reported that they brushed their teeth more 2 weeks earlier 
than those who had received an anti- toothbrushing message. Thus, not only are prior 
attitudes misremembered to be consistent with current attitudes, but so also are prior 
behaviors.
The work on misremembering attitudes and attitude- relevant behavior is consis-
tent with a more general phenomenon in which people misremember aspects of their 
past to make it seem more like the present. For example, in one study (McFarland 
& Ross, 1987), participants provided ratings of their dating partner over time, then 
attempted to recall their initial ratings. A key result was that when the relationship 
improved over time, people misremembered the relationship as initially being better 
than it was, and when the relationship became worse over time, people misremem-
bered it as initially being worse than it was (see also Ross, 1989).
In many of the studies on recall of past attitudes, the new attitude that was 
misremembered was invoked externally by another person and may not have been 
desired. To our knowledge, there is little research examining perceptions of change 
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when the change is desired or self- initiated. Perhaps in such situations people would 
overestimate the extent of change. In a potentially relevant example, Conway and 
Ross (1984) asked students in a study skills course to evaluate their progress follow-
ing completion of the course. Although the course was actually ineffective, it looked 
useful and participants assumed it was. Thus, in this case, they inferred change in 
the absence of any real change by exaggerating how bad their study skills were before 
they took the course. This provided the illusion of change in a desired direction; 
that is, in this case, people presumably wanted better study skills over time and they 
misremembered the past to bring about this perception. In a somewhat similar way, 
people have been shown to recall their past selves as inferior to their current selves so 
that an image of improvement to a currently desired state, rather than a deterioration 
from the past, is established (see Wilson & Ross, 2003).
Taken together, the various studies suggest that people can err in either 
direction— seeing no change in their attitudes or themselves when there actually has 
been change, and seeing some change when there actually has been none (see Schryer 
& Ross, 2012, for a review). People’s inferences about change appear to be guided by 
not only a need to be consistent (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsome, 1995), but also a need 
to hold a positive self-view (Baumeister, 1998) and, ideally, one more positive than 
that in the past. By believing they did not change their attitudes to a counterposition 
but did become more effective in their study skills or personal habits, people can 
maintain a self- enhancing view of themselves as becoming better over time.
Knowing the Attitudes We Want to Have
Just as people’s current perceptions of themselves (actual self) can differ from the per-
ceptions they want to have (ideal self; see Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986), 
the attitudes people currently hold about a wide variety of objects, issues, or other 
people can be different from the attitudes they would like to possess. For example, a 
dieter might want to like fast food less and vegetables more, whereas an environmen-
talist might want to like gas- guzzling SUVs less and bicycling more. Stated simply, 
people know not only the attitudes they already possess but also that they would like 
to have different attitudes. In a recent review, Maio and Thomas (2007) suggested 
that discrepancies between actual and desired opinions often exist, and that people 
appear to engage in strategies that attempt to bring about change toward the desired 
opinions.
Recently, DeMarree and colleagues (2011) examined whether discrepancies 
between actual and desired attitudes could be a source of evaluative conflict, and 
might therefore account for some of the unexplained variance observed repeatedly in 
subjective ambivalence research (cf. Priester & Petty, 1996). The unpleasant conflict 
from not having the attitude one wants could serve as the motivation to change it. In a 
series of studies, participants indicated their current attitudes toward a diverse num-
ber of issues and were asked to report whether they wanted to possess an attitude that 
differed from the one they just reported, and if so, whether they wanted their atti-
tude to be more positive or negative and how much so. A measure of actual- desired 
attitude discrepancy was created and then used to predict subjective ambivalence. As 
hypothesized, actual- desired attitude discrepancies predicted feelings of conflict over 
and above both intrapersonal and interpersonal ambivalence.
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The research on actual-ideal attitude discrepancies raises the possibility that peo-
ple might want to regulate their attitudes in much the same way they regulate other 
self- aspects. Furthermore, the prevalence of these discrepancies and the robustness of 
their association with subjective ambivalence might be surprising. After all, people 
are presumably free to change their evaluations at any moment. That such discrepan-
cies persist suggests limitations on people’s ability to control their own evaluations 
(see also Wheeler et al., 2007). Perhaps especially when attitudes have an affective 
basis, it is difficult to create desired attitudes. Imagine a person who for all sorts of 
rational reasons wants to work things out with a spouse. However, because of the 
difficulty people have in manufacturing needed emotions, some attitudes are not so 
easy to change. Indeed, if people could choose whom to fall in love with or choose 
not to be attracted to someone who isn’t their spouse, the divorce rate would be a lot 
lower. Furthermore, social constraints, reality constraints, personality factors, con-
sistency pressures, goal pursuit, and the like, all can make it difficult to adopt desired 
attitudes, leading to conflict between one’s current evaluations and the ones that are 
most wanted. It might not be possible ever to eliminate such conflict entirely. Instead, 
as best they can individuals might hold evaluations that are a tradeoff between these 
various intrapersonal and interpersonal pressures, resulting in evaluative tension that 
is invoked whenever the attitude is considered.
Knowing How to Persuade
People have their own naive theories of persuasion—what they think works and what 
they think does not. Schank and Abelson (1977), in their classic treatise on scripts, 
plans, and goals, suggested that people have a schema detailing the methods that can 
be used to influence others (called the persuade package). In one of the first empiri-
cal investigations of people’s persuasion schemas, Rule, Bisanz, and Kohn (1985) 
found that people reported using persuasion tactics for a wide variety of goals, such 
as changing other people’s opinions and getting others to do things for them. People 
also reported using a wide variety of influence tactics, such as providing facts and 
evidence; invoking social norms; and using emotion (e.g., crying), flattery, force, and 
deception.
Subsequent research has shown that the persuasion theories held by men and 
women are quite similar and that men and women report using the different persua-
sion tactics in the same order (i.e., simply ask first and use force last; Bisanz & Rule, 
1989). However, the persuasion strategy people think they would use can vary with 
the specific goals of persuaders, as well as their topic- relevant knowledge (Roskos-
 Ewoldsen, 1997).
Related to the persuasion schema notion, Friestad and Wright (1994, 1995), in 
their more recent persuasion knowledge model, have suggested that through expo-
sure to persuasion over the lifespan, people develop beliefs about how persuasion 
works (i.e., the mechanisms of persuasion). For example, people have beliefs about 
the effectiveness and necessity of factors in advertising, such as attending to, trusting, 
and remembering the advertisement. Research based on this model has suggested that 
such beliefs can play an important role in how people respond to persuasion attempts. 
For example, Campbell and Kirmani (2000) found that consumers viewed a salesper-
son as less sincere when persuasion knowledge was made accessible than when it was 
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not. Seeing the salesperson as less sincere would presumably make persuasion by that 
salesperson more difficult.
Not only do people have theories about how to persuade others and the mecha-
nisms of persuasion, but they also have naive theories about how to resist influence. 
Jacks and Cameron (2003) identified seven resistance strategies that people reported 
using and found that people were more likely to report using message- related strate-
gies to resist persuasion, such as counterargument, than less socially acceptable strat-
egies, such as source derogation. Furthermore, people reported using different strate-
gies depending on factors such as their issue- relevant knowledge and the importance 
of the issue.
In addition to their notions of particular strategies of resistance and when they 
are used, people appear to believe that resistance requires some cognitive effort. This 
may explain why forewarning people of an impending persuasion attempt leads them 
to get their guard up (Allyn & Festinger, 1961). In some research, people have engaged 
in anticipatory counterargument prior to receiving a persuasive message (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979a). In other research (Janssen, Fennis, & Pruyn, 2010), forewarning 
of persuasion motivated people to conserve their cognitive resources for the upcom-
ing message, and this was reflected in reduced performance on an intermediate self-
 control task.
Just as metabeliefs about other aspects of attitudes have important cognitive and 
behavior effects, so too are people’s naive theories of resistance consequential. For 
example, in one study (Rydell, Hugenberg, & McConnell, 2006), people who believed 
that resistance is good (i.e., implies intelligence) became more certain of the validity 
of their attitudes following their successful resistance to strong arguments, replicat-
ing earlier research (Tormala & Petty, 2002), but people who believed that resistance 
was bad (i.e., implied closed- mindedness) did not show any increased certainty.
Of course, the possession of theories of persuasion and resistance does not mean 
that the theories are accurate. There is relatively little work on this topic and what 
evidence exists presents a mixed picture. For example, some research suggests that 
people appear to be aware of one tenet of the elaboration likelihood model of persua-
sion, the notion that people rely on simple cues more than extensive message pro-
cessing when their motivation or ability to think about a message is reduced (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). For example, in one study (Vogel, Kutzner, Fiedler, & Freytag, 
2010), individuals’ naive theories about the simple cue of source attractiveness were 
investigated. Participants were asked about the extent to which a seller’s attractive-
ness would influence persuasion when the customers were relatively high or low in 
their motivation or ability to think. Motivation was varied by describing the custom-
ers as relatively high or low in their need for cognition (i.e., enjoyment of thinking; 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and ability was varied by describing the customers as being 
under time pressure to make a decision or not (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
The participants reported that a salesperson’s attractiveness would impact persua-
sion primarily when both motivation and ability to think were low. In other research, 
people were found to believe generally that individuals who do not like to think are 
more susceptible to a variety of simple cues used in advertising than are those who 
like to think (Douglas, Sutton, & Stathi, 2010).
These naive theories about the use of attractiveness and other simple cues appear 
to be accurate, in that they fit the available data well about how and when people 
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actually respond to simple cues (e.g., Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). Most 
importantly, perhaps, people use their naive theories of persuasion to guide their own 
actions. For example, in a series of studies, Vogel and colleagues (2010) found that 
not only did attractive individuals believe that they were more likely to be effective 
in influencing people who did not enjoy thinking compared to those who did, but 
they also were more likely to select customers described as low in motivation to think 
versus customers described as relatively high in motivation to think.
Although this research suggests that people have some persuasion- relevant knowl-
edge that fits actual findings, other research suggests that people are not always well 
tuned to the type of appeal that would effectively influence them. For example, in one 
study (Wilson et al., 1998), students were asked to select one of two messages based 
on which would influence them the least. The two choices were an explicit speech 
against their attitudes or a subliminal message. Although the explicit speech was far 
more effective in producing actual attitude change than the subliminal communica-
tion, 69% of the participants chose the speech over the subliminal tape, mistakenly 
believing that the latter would have the more powerful effect. Additional analyses 
suggested that people believed that the speech would be easy to counterargue and 
they selected it for that reason. With respect to the method of resisting persuasion, 
Jacks and Cameron (2003) found that although people believed that both counter-
arguing and attitude bolstering would help them resist, and they used both, only the 
former strategy actually was effective.
In summary, people have naive theories regarding both persuasion and resis-
tance, and those theories, though not completely accurate, can guide how people 
interact with others. Less research has addressed people’s theories about the ways in 
which they might go about persuading themselves when change is desired. Though 
not investigating particular strategies of change, some research has examined people’s 
theories about the effort required to produce change in the self versus others (Briñol, 
McCaslin, & Petty, in press). This research assumes that people hold the reasonable 
belief that persuading oneself is more difficult when the topic is counterattitudinal 
rather than proattitudinal, and that people further believe they know their own opin-
ions better than they know the opinions of others (cf. Dunning et al., 2004). Because 
of this, when the topic of the persuasion task is counterattitudinal, people invest 
more effort in a message designed to persuade themselves than to persuade another 
person because they are sure they are opposed but less sure of the opposition of the 
other. The reverse is the case when the message is proattitudinal. Here, people invest 
less effort in the message designed to persuade themselves than to persuade another 
person because they are less sure that the other person agrees already. The extent of 
actual self- persuasion follows the effort expended in the persuasion task.
Prior research has clearly shown that when people were asked to generate a mes-
sage with the goal of persuading another person, they themselves often were inciden-
tally changed in the process (e.g., see Janis & King, 1954). The more recent research 
by Briñol and colleagues (in press) shows that because of people’s naive theories 
about how much effort is necessary to persuade themselves versus another person, 
depending on the message topic, self- persuasion can be greater if the intended target 
of the self- generated message is the self rather than another person when the per-
suasion task is a counterattitudinal one. However, the opposite holds if the task is 
proattitudinal.
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Knowing How Persuadable or Resistant We Are
We have just noted that people have naive theories about what causes persuasion and 
resistance, and they also have some notion of how much effort might be required 
to bring about persuasion. This suggests that people have ideas about their own 
persuadability—how easy or difficult they are to persuade. To provide an explicit 
exploration of people’s theories about their own influenceability, Briñol, Rucker, Tor-
mala, and Petty (2004) developed a Resistance to Persuasion Scale (RPS). The scale 
contains statements such as “It is hard for me to change my ideas,” to which people 
report the extent of their agreement. Research using the scale has shown that beliefs 
about resistance to persuasion are consequential for attitude change.
In two studies Briñol and colleagues (2004) predicted and found that individuals 
exhibited attitude change consistent with their perceptions about their own persuad-
ability when they were not very motivated to think (i.e., were low in need for cogni-
tion; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Interestingly, when the likelihood of thinking was 
high (i.e., high need for cognition), they appeared to correct for their persuadability 
beliefs. Specifically, among low- thinking participants, individuals who believed that 
they were generally resistant to persuasion showed less attitude change when exposed 
to various messages than did individuals who believed that they were generally sus-
ceptible to persuasion. However, participants high in thinking showed a tendency 
for a reverse effect, demonstrating more persuasion when they thought they were 
difficult to persuade. Under high- thinking conditions, people appeared to treat their 
presumed tendency to be persuaded or resistant as a bias for which they needed to 
correct by acting in an opposite way. The fact that people correct for bias under high- 
but not low- thinking conditions is consistent with much other research on correction 
processes, showing that correction typically requires high thinking and occurs when 
people become aware of an unwanted influence on their judgments (e.g., see DeSteno, 
Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004; Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Horcajo, & 
Strathman, 2008).
Importantly, even two individuals who see themselves as equivalent in resistance 
to change may believe that they resist influence through very different means. The 
Bolster– Counterargue Scale (BCS; Briñol et al., 2004) was developed to assess indi-
viduals’ beliefs about how they resist influence. An example item geared toward those 
who prefer to counterargue is “I take pleasure in arguing with those who have opin-
ions that differ from my own.” An item geared toward those who prefer to bolster is 
“When someone gives me a point of view that conflicts with my attitudes, I like to 
think about why my views are right for me.”
In a study designed to examine the impact of people’s perceptions of the strate-
gies they use to resist persuasion, Briñol and colleagues (2004) found that scores 
on the Bolstering subscale were positively correlated with the number of bolstering 
thoughts, whereas the Counterarguing subscale was positively correlated with the 
number of counterarguments generated (but not vice versa). Thus, the spontaneous 
generation of each type of cognitive response when trying to resist a message can vary 
from one individual to another, and the BCS seems useful for assessing these indi-
vidual differences. The predictive utility of the scale, of course, suggests that people 
have some insight into the strategies they use to resist persuasive messages.
Other lines of research on individual differences suggest that the beliefs people 
have about their own abilities to defend their attitudes are also consequential in terms 
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of influencing information exposure. For example, according to research on defensive 
confidence by Albarracín and Mitchell (2004), the beliefs people have about their 
ability to defend their attitudes moderate their approach to attitude- consistent infor-
mation. Specifically, individuals who feel confident in their ability to defend their 
beliefs pay more attention to information that threatens their beliefs than individuals 
who do not feel confident in their ability to defend their abilities.
Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have described research regarding what people know about their 
attitudes, the qualities of their attitudes, what their attitudes do, and whether and 
how their attitudes can be changed. In the first part of the chapter, we discussed 
how people generally know what their attitudes are (i.e., whether they like or dislike 
some attitude object) but sometimes have automatic evaluative reactions that they 
do not endorse. Furthermore, consistent with literature in other domains, people 
are generally less aware of why they hold the attitudes they do. In particular, the 
available research has shown that what people actually know about the bases of 
their attitudes and what they think they know can be two very different things. For 
example, although people sometimes have good insight into some qualities of their 
attitudes (e.g., how much thinking they have done), at other times the correlations 
between objective assessments and subjective assessments hover around zero (e.g., 
regarding the affective or cognitive bases of attitudes). We also noted that people can 
acknowledge having evaluative conflict around some issues (explicit ambivalence) but 
do not acknowledge being conflicted about other issues, though discomfort neverthe-
less exists (implicit ambivalence). Regardless of whether ambivalence is explicit or 
implicit, both forms of conflict have important implications for information process-
ing and attitude change.
In the second part of the chapter we described how people sometimes change their 
attitudes without realizing it, whereas at other times they think they have changed 
when in fact they have not. Furthermore, sometimes people change without wanting 
to, whereas other times they try to change intentionally. Of course, just wanting to 
change does not guarantee that people can change to attain more desired attitudes. 
We also noted that people have beliefs about how persuasion works, their own per-
suadability and resistance to change, and they have ideas about how persuasion and 
resistance are accomplished.
Although people’s theories and feelings about their attitudes and susceptibility 
to change are not always grounded in reality, they can nonetheless be consequential. 
For example, with respect to the bases of their attitudes, we have seen that (1) feel-
ing conflicted about an attitude or thinking that it is based on little knowledge leads 
people to be more attentive to attitude- relevant information even if they don’t fully 
understand the basis of the conflict or have an accurate assessment of their amount 
of knowledge; (2) targeting a message to what people believe their attitude is based 
on (affect or cognition) can be effective in modifying the attitude, even if the attitude 
is not really based on that factor; (3) if people come to believe that their attitudes are 
based on much thought, they are more likely to act on those attitudes, even if that 
perception has no real basis; and (4) people correct their attitudes for biases they 
believe have occurred rather than the biases that have actually occurred.
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With respect to attitude change, we have seen that people don’t always know 
when their attitudes have changed, and they have theories on how to bring change 
about in themselves and others. They also have theories about how to resist persua-
sion. Understanding these theories is important because people act on their theories 
even if their theories are incorrect. One might imagine that if people became persua-
sion experts and were aware of the relevant literature on how persuasion works, they 
could bring about optimal outcomes. However, because social- psychological knowl-
edge on persuasion is aimed at understanding people in general, even the most astute 
persuasion scholar would not have completely accurate information about him- or 
herself. Nevertheless, such knowledge is likely to provide a useful guide for suggest-
ing self- relevant hypotheses in everyday life.
RefeRenceS
Alba, J. W., & Hutchinson W. (2000). Knowledge calibration: What consumers know and 
what they think they know. Journal of Consumer Research, 22, 62–74.
Albarracín, D., & Mitchell, A. L. (2004). The role of defensive confidence in preference for 
proatttitudinal information: How believing that one is strong can be a weakness. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1565–1584.
Allyn, J., & Festinger, L. (1961). The effectiveness of unanticipated persuasive communica-
tion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 35–40.
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence: A test of three key hypoth-
eses. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1421–1432.
Barden, J., & Petty, R. E. (2008). The mere perception of elaboration creates attitude cer-
tainty: Exploring the thoughtfulness heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 95, 489–509.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic 
attitude activation effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 893–913.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Raymond, P., & Hymes, C. (1996). The automatic evaluation 
effect: Unconditional automatic attitude activation with a pronunciation task. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 104–128.
Bassili, J. N. (1996). Meta- judgmental versus operative indices of psychological properties: 
The case of measures of attitude strength. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
71, 637–653.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook 
of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 680–740). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Belding, J., Briñol, P., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Priming through embodiment: External objects 
influence information processing and attitudes. Unpublished manuscript, Ohio State 
University.
Bem, D. J., & McConnell, H. K. (1970). Testing the self- perception explanation of dissonance 
phenomena: On the salience of premanipulation attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 14, 23–31.
Bisanz, G. L., & Rule, B. G. (1989). Gender and the persuasion schema: A search for cogni-
tive invariants. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 4–18.
Breckler, S. J. (1984). Empirical validation of affect, behavior, and congtion as distinct com-
ponents of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1191–1205.
Briñol, P., McCaslin, M. J., & Petty, R. E. (in press). Self- generated persuasion: Effects of the 
target and direction of arguments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., Gallardo, I., & DeMarree, K. G. (2007). The effects of self- affirmation 
 Knowing Our Attitudes and How to Change Them 175
in non- threatening persuasion domains: Timing affects the process. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1533–1546.
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Wheeler, S. C. (2006). Discrepancies between explicit and implicit 
self- concepts: Consequences for information processing. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 91, 154–170.
Briñol, P., Rucker, D. D., Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2004). Individual differences in 
resistance to persuasion: The role of beliefs and meta- beliefs. In E.S. Knowles & J.A. 
Linn (Eds.), Resistance and persuasion (pp. 83–104). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brucks, M. (1985). The effects of product class knowledge on information search behavior. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 12, 1–16.
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42, 116–131.
Campbell, M. C., & Kirmani, A. (2000). Consumers’ use of persuasion knowledge: The 
effects of accessibility and cognitive capacity on perceptions of an influence agent. Jour-
nal of Consumer Research, 27, 69–83.
Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., & Newsome, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The 
development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 318–328.
Clark, J. K., Wegener, D. T., & Fabrigar, L. R. (2008). Attitudinal ambivalence and message-
based persuasion: Motivated processing of proattitudinal information and avoidance of 
counterattitudinal information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 565–
577.
Conway, M., & Ross, M. (1984). Getting what you want by revising what you had. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 738–748.
Crites, S., Fabrigar, L., & Petty, R. E. (1994). Measuring the affective and cognitive proper-
ties of attitudes: Conceptual and methodological issues. Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy Bulletin, 20, 619–634.
DeCoster, J., Banner, M. J., Smith, E. R., & Semin, G. R. (2006). On the inexplicability of 
the implicit: Differences in the information provided by implicit and explicit tests. Social 
Cognition, 24, 5–21.
DeMarree, K. G., Wheeler, C., Briñol, P., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Wanting other attitudes: 
Actual- desired attitude discrepancies predict feelings of ambivalence. Unpublished man-
uscript, Ohio State University.
DeSteno, D., Petty, R. E., Rucker, D. D., Wegener, D. T., & Braverman, J. (2004). Discrete 
emotions and persuasion: The role of emotion- induced expectancies. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 86, 43–56.
Dijksterhuis, A., Albers, L. W., & Bongers, K. C. A. (2009). Digging for the real attitude: 
Lessons from research on implicit and explicit self- esteem. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & 
P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp. 229–250). New 
York: Psychology Press.
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Stathi, S. (2010). Why I am persuaded less than you: 
People’s intuitive understanding of the psychology of persuasion. Social Influence, 5, 
133–148.
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., Johnson, C., Johnson, B., & Howard, A. (1997). The nature of 
prejudice: Automatic and controlled processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 33, 510–540.
Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2004). Flawed self- assessment: Implications for health, 
education, and the workplace. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 69–106.
Edwards, K. (1990). The interplay of affect and cognition in attitude formation and change. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 202–216.
Epstein, S. (2003). Cognitive- experiential self- theory of personality. In T. Millon & M. Lerner 
176 DOMAINS OF SELF‑KNOWLEDgE
(Eds.), Handbook of psychology: Personality and social psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 159–
184). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Fabrigar, L. R., & Petty, R. E. (1999). The role of the affective and cognitive bases of attitudes 
in susceptibility to affectively and cognitively based persuasion. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 25, 363–381.
Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object- evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, 
and correlates of attitude accessibility. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude 
strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 247–282). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic 
activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1013–1027.
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the automatic 
activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 229–238.
Fazio, R. H., & Zanna, M. P. (1978). Attitudinal qualities relating to the strength of the 
attitude– behavior relationship. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 398–
408.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Fox, M. C., Ericsson, K. A., & Best, R. ( 2011). Do procedures for verbal reporting of think-
ing have to reactive?: A meta- analysis and recommendations for best reporting methods. 
Psychological Bulletin, 137, 316–344.
Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (1994). The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How people cope with 
persuasion attempts. Journal of Consumer Research, 21, 1–31.
Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (1995). Persuasion knowledge: Lay peoples and researchers beliefs 
about the psychology of advertising. Journal of Consumer Research, 22, 62–74.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 692–731.
Goethals, G. & Nelson, R. E. (1973). Similarity in the influence process: The belief–value 
distinction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 117–122.
Goethals, G. R., & Reckman, R. F. (1973). The perception of consistency in attitudes. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9, 491–501.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self- esteem, and 
stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4–27.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual dif-
ferences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480.
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding 
and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta- analysis of predictive validity. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 17–41.
Haddock, G., Rothman, A. J., Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Forming judgments of atti-
tude certainty, intensity, and importance: The role of subjective experiences. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 771–782.
Haugtvedt, C. P., Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1992). Need for cognition and advertising: 
Understanding the role of personality variables in consumer behavior. Journal of Con-
sumer Psychology, 1, 239–260.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self- discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological 
Review, 94, 319–340.
Horcajo, J., Petty, R. E., &, Briñol, P. (2010). The effects of majority versus minority source 
status on persuasion: A self- validation analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 99, 498–512.
 Knowing Our Attitudes and How to Change Them 177
Jacks, J. Z., & Cameron, K. A. (2003). Strategies of resisting persuasion. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 25, 145–161.
Janis, I. L., & King, B. T. (1954). The influence of role- playing on opinion change. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49, 211–218.
Janssen, L., Fennis, B. M., & Pruyn, A. T. H. (2010). Forewarned is forearmed: Conserving 
self- control strength to resist social influence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 46, 911–921.
Jarvis, W. B. G., & Petty, R. E. (1996). The need to evaluate. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 70, 172–194.
Jordan, C. H., Whitfield, M., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2007). Intuition and the correspondence 
between implicit and explicit self- esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
93, 1067–1079.
Kaplan, K. J. (1972). On the ambivalence– indifference problem in attitude theory and mea-
surement: A suggested modification of the semantic differential technique. Psychological 
Bulletin, 77, 361–372.
Kellerman, J., & Laird, J. D. (1982). The effect of appearance on self- perceptions. Journal of 
Personality, 50, 296–315.
Kiesler, C. A. (1971). The psychology of commitment: Experiments linking behavior to 
beliefs. New York: Academic Press.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M., (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: Seizing and 
freezing. Psychological Review, 103, 263–283.
Loersch, C., McCaslin, M., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Exploring the impact of social judgeability 
concerns on the interplay of associative and deliberative attitude processes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 1029–1032.
Maio, G. R., Bell, D. E., & Esses, V. M. (1996). Ambivalence and persuasion: The processing 
of messages about immigrant groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 
513–536.
Maio, G. R., & Thomas, G. (2007). The epistemic– teleological model of self persuasion. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 1–22.
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41, 954–969.
McFarland, C., & Ross, M. (1987). The relation between current impressions and memories 
of self and dating partners. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 228–238.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259.
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2003). Relations between implicit measures of racial prejudice: 
What are we measuring? Psychological Science, 14, 636–639.
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Implicit and explicit measures of attitudes: The per-
spective of the MODE model. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: 
Insights from the new implicit measures (pp. 19–64). New York: Psychology Press.
Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2006). A meta- cognitive approach to “implicit” and “explicit” 
evaluations: Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). Psychological Bulletin, 
132, 740–744.
Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2009). Implicit ambivalence: A meta- cognitive approach. In R. E. 
Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures 
(pp. 119–161). New York: Psychology Press.
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & DeMarree, K. G. (2007). The meta- cognitive model (MCM) of atti-
tudes: Implications for attitude measurement, change, and strength. Social Cognition, 
25, 657–686.
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Tormala, Z. L., & Wegener, D. T. (2007). The role of metacognition 
in social judgment. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski, (Eds.), Social psychology: A 
handbook of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 254–284). New York: Guilford Press.
178 DOMAINS OF SELF‑KNOWLEDgE
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979a). Effects of forewarning of persuasive intent on cogni-
tive responses and persuasion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, 173–176.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979b). Issue- involvement can increase or decrease persuasion 
by enhancing message- relevant cognitive responses. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 37, 1915–1926.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). The effects of involvement on responses to argument 
quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 46, 69–81.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and periph-
eral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer- Verlag.
Petty, R. E., DeMarree, K. G., Briñol, P., Horcajo, J., & Strathman, A. J. (2008). Need for 
cognition can magnify or attenuate priming effects in social judgment. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 900–912.
Petty, R. E., Fazio, R. H., & Briñol, P. (2009). The new implicit measures: An overview. In 
R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit 
measures (pp. 3–18). New York: Psychology Press.
Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude 
strength: Creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, and predictive of behavior. In 
R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences 
(pp. 93–130). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Petty, R. E., & Krosnick, J. A. (Eds.). (1995). Attitude strength: Antecedents and conse-
quences. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Petty, R. E., Tormala, Z. L., Briñol, P., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (2006). Implicit ambivalence from 
attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 21–41.
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1993). Flexible correction processes in social judgment: Cor-
recting for context- induced contrast. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 
137–165.
Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & White, P. (1998). Flexible correction processes in social judg-
ment: Implications for persuasion. Social Cognition, 16, 93–113.
Petty, R. E., Wells, G. L., & Brock, T. C. (1976). Distraction can enhance or reduce yielding 
to propaganda: Thought disruption versus effort justification. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 34, 874–884.
Priester, J. M., & Petty, R. E. (1996). The gradual threshold model of ambivalence: Relating 
the positive and negative bases of attitudes to subjective ambivalence. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 71, 431–449.
Priester, J. R., Petty. R. E., & Park, K. (2007). Whence univalent ambivalence: From the 
anticipation of conflicting reactions. Journal of Consumer Research, 34, 11–21.
Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (2001). Extending the bases of subjective attitudinal ambiva-
lence: Interpersonal and intrapersonal antecedents of evaluative tension. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 80, 19–34.
Radecki, C. M., & Jaccard, J. (1995). Perceptions of knowledge, actual knowledge and infor-
mation search behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 107–138.
Ranganath, K. A., Smith, C. T., & Nosek, B. A. (2008). Distinguishing automatic and con-
trolled components of attitudes from direct and indirect measurement methods. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 386–396.
Roskos- Ewoldsen, D. R. (1997). Implicit theories of persuasion. Human Communication 
Research, 24, 31–63.
Ross, M. (1989). The relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories. 
Psychological Review, 96, 341–357.
 Knowing Our Attitudes and How to Change Them 179
Ross, M., McFarland, C., & Fletcher, G. J. (1981). The effect of attitude on the recall of per-
sonal histories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 627–634.
Rucker, D. D., Lee, A., & Briñol, P. (2011). The aftermath of information acquisition: Some-
times knowing more feels like knowing less. Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern 
University.
Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2004). When resistance is futile: Consequences of failed coun-
terarguing on attitude certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 219–
235.
Rucker, D. D., Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2008). What’s in a frame anyway?: A meta- cognitive 
analysis of the impact of one versus two sided message framing on attitude certainty. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18, 137–149.
Rule, B., Bisanz, G., & Kohn, M. (1985). Anatomy of persuasion schema: Targets, goals, and 
strategies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1127–1140.
Rydell, R. J., Hugenberg, K., & McConnell, A. R. (2006). Resistance can be good or bad: 
How theories of resistance and dissonance affect attitude certainty. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 740–750.
Rydell, R. J., & McConnell, A. R. (2006). Understanding implicit and explicit attitude 
change: A systems of reasoning analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
91, 995–1008.
Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2008). Consequences of discrepant explicit 
and implicit attitudes: Cognitive dissonance and increased information processing. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1526–1532.
Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds: 
Forming and changing valence- inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological 
Science, 17, 954–958.
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding: An inquiry 
into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Schryer, E., & Ross, M. (2012). People s´ thoughts about their personal past and futures. In 
P. Briñol & K. G. DeMarree (Eds.), Social metacognition (pp. 141–158). New York: 
Psychology Press.
See, Y. H. M., Petty, R. E., & Fabrigar, L. R. (2008). Affective and cognitive meta-bases of 
attitudes: Unique effects on information interest and persuasion. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 94, 938–955.
Smith, S. M., Fabrigar, L. R., MacDougall, B. L., & Wiesentahl, N. L. (2008). The role of 
amount, cognitive elaboration, and structural consistency of attitude- relevant knowl-
edge in the formation of attitude certainty. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 
280–295.
Sparks, P., Harris, P. R., & Lockwood, N. (2004). Predictors and predictive effects of ambiva-
lence. British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 371–383.
Thompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., & Griffin, D. W. (1995). Let’s not be indifferent about 
(attitudinal) ambivalence. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: 
Antecedents and consequences (pp. 361–386). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2002). What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger: The effects of 
resisting persuasion on attitude certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
83, 1298–1313.
Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2007). Contextual contrast and perceived knowledge: Explor-
ing the implications for persuasion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 
17–30.
Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2007). Attitude certainty: A review of past findings and 
emerging perspectives. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 469–492.
180 DOMAINS OF SELF‑KNOWLEDgE
van Harreveld, F., van der Pligt, J., & de Liver, Y. N. (2009). The agony of ambivalence and 
ways to resolve it: Introducing the MAID model. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 13, 45–61.
Visser, P. S., & Holbrook, A. L. (2012). Metacognitive determinants of attitude strength. In 
P. Briñol & K. G. DeMarree (Eds.), Social metacognition (pp. 21–42). New York: Psy-
chology Press.
Vogel, T., Kutzner, F., Fiedler, K., & Freytag, P. (2010). Exploiting attractiveness in persua-
sion: Senders’ implicit theories about receivers’ processing motivation. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 830–842.
Wagner, B. C., Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2011). Are morally-based attitudes particularly 
strong?: The impact of moral attitudinal basis on attitude strength indicators and con-
sequences. Unpublished manuscript, Ohio State University.
Wegener, D. T., Downing, J., Krosnick, J. A., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Measures and manipula-
tions of strength related properties of attitudes: Current practice and future directions. 
In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences 
(pp. 455–488). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (1997). The flexible correction model: The role of naive theo-
ries of bias in bias correction. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 141–208). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wheeler, S. C., DeMarree, K. G., & Petty, R. E. (2007). Understanding the role of the self 
in prime-to- behavior effects: The active self account. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 11, 234–261.
Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2003). Autobiographical memory and self- identity. Memory, 11, 
137–149.
Wilson, T. D., & Brekke, N. (1994). Mental contamination and mental correction: Unwanted 
influences on judgments and evaluations. Psychological Bulletin, 116, 117–142.
Wilson, T. D., Dunn, D. S., Bybee, J. A., Hyman, D. B., & Rotondo, J. A. (1984). Effects of 
analyzing reasons on attitude– behavior consistency. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 47, 5–16.
Wilson, T. D., & Hodges, S. D. (1992). Attitudes as temporary constructions. In L.L. Martin 
& A. Tesser (Eds.), The construction of social judgments (pp. 37–65). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum.
Wilson, T. D., Houston, C. E., & Meyers, J. M. (1998). Choose your poison: Effects of lay 
beliefs about mental processes on attitude change. Social Cognition, 16, 114–132.
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. Psychological 
Review, 107, 101–126.
Wood, W., Rhodes, N., & Biek, M. (1995). Working knowledge and attitude strength: An 
information processing analysis. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: 
Antecedents and consequences (pp. 283–314). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Zanna, M. P., & Rempel, J. K. (1988). Attitudes: A new look at an old concept. In D. Bar-Tal 
& A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), The social psychology of knowledge (pp. 315–334). Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Copyright © 2012 The Guilford Press. 
No part of this text may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval 
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written 
permission from the publisher. 
Purchase this book now:  www.guilford.com/p/vazire 
Guilford Publications 
370 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1200 
New York, NY 10001 
212-431-9800 
800-365-7006 
www.guilford.com 
